



The German green party Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen and security and defence policy: pursuing a moderate line

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Translated from the French

Introduction

- **Party influence on German security and defence policy**

Speaking to students at Bundeswehr University in Munich on 7 November 2019, German Defence Minister and outgoing leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, emphasised how national interests guided the formulation and execution of missions of the armed forces. This suggested a broad national consensus on the very definition of interests to be defended and that such a direction required technical action above all. She ultimately gave the impression that, at the level of political parties, the subject was neutral. Yet, the Minister's address sparked off a flood of negative reactions from the coalition's social democratic partner (SPD) and the opposition in parliament. It did not lead to any adjustments to political action either.

This example, which is similar in many ways both to other older cases (military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq) and more recent ones (revival of defence credits, renewal of the Tornado aircraft, Syrian crisis), illustrates two more general observations. Firstly, the fact that concluding coalition agreements defining governmental orientations and engaging in permanent negotiations to implement them do not prevent conflicts between governing parties, whether they are due to political rivalry or ideology. Furthermore, although dissensions over security and defence matters have never been sufficiently intense to break up a coalition in Germany, their effects can vary, ranging from adopting a widely acceptable compromise to cancelling the decision, with multiple turnarounds in the national position in the meantime. Secondly, defence topics continue to generate debates between parties. Over the long term, we have even seen how the confrontation of different visions leads to variations, in the event of a change of political leadership. Previous experiences show that fluctuations in the political complexion of coalitions have not brought about any fundamental political reorientation, but they have given different connotations to certain focuses of public action, such as arms export policy, budget choices, or the conditions of employing military force.

- **Taking account of political parties in general and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens) in particular**

We would therefore be stumbling into a pitfall by eliminating the question of parties from the study of interactions between political players and German defence and security policy. Of course, the parties are not, strictly speaking, part of the core German decision-making body. But they are the main body nominating the individuals who hold political office (both parliamentary and ministerial). They develop political concepts and programmes, at least with a view to competing in elections, and therefore contribute to public debate. They are also involved, on a mainly informal basis¹, in the work of the Bundestag² parliamentary groups and, in the event of election victory, in negotiations on the formation of the governing coalition and policy coordination. Basically, parties have the ability to contribute to the formulation of public policies, and to legitimize or, conversely, delegitimize government policy.

Bearing this in mind, several pathways of analysis are possible³. One consists in focusing on the life of political parties themselves. This study intends to contribute to that approach, by concentrating on the stand currently taken by Alliance 90/The Greens in security and defence matters. This party's choice is not arbitrary. It is dictated by the current political context. Whereas the so-called people's parties, SPD and Union (CDU and its Bavarian ally CSU) or the liberal party FDP would appear weakened individually and/or ideologically, the Green Party continues on an upward trajectory, while moving towards the centre of the scene. At regional level, Alliance 90/The Greens has established itself in 11 of the 16 Länder governments. And its influence in the European Parliament⁴ has also grown.

At federal level, a lot remains to be done. Today, the party only represents the smallest opposition force: in strictly numerical terms, it has the smallest parliamentary group in the lower house, i.e. 67 out of a total of 709 seats. However, with the prospect of renewal of the Bundestag by autumn 2021 at the latest, opinion polls situate it between the Union and SPD. It would therefore be well positioned to return to federal government. It could then be a minor partner in a two- or multi-party coalition – as between 1998 and 2005 under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder or as was envisioned in 2017 in an unprecedented federal team of conservatives, liberals and greens –, or establish itself as a leading force of a coalition. In either case, the party would be qualified to hold a government position in which it would take part in decision-making on foreign affairs and security (Federal Chancellery, Foreign Affairs, Defence and/or Development). It could also weigh more heavily in Parliament.

¹ According to Article 38 of the *Basic Law*, members of parliament “*shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or instructions and responsible only to their conscience.*” They are all the more independent from the bodies of their party as they enjoy financial autonomy, guaranteed by Article 50 of the law on the members of the Bundestag (*Abgeordnetengesetz*).

² The Bundestag is a joint decision-making body on matters of deploying the Bundeswehr in external operations and Federal budget. Based on this latter prerogative, in 1981, its Budget commission established itself, amid strong parliamentary resentment against the Defence ministry's procurement policy, as the decisive player in choices of major military equipment (in excess of €25 million).

³ Bastien Irondele, *La politique de défense est-elle apolitique ?*, Sciences Po, CERI, 2007.

⁴ In just a decade, the party's number of elected representatives has risen, to reach 21 in the May 2019 elections from 14 in 2009. In comparison, the CDU-CSU holds 29 seats and the SPD 16.

- **Aims of the study**

Such an approach does not seek to serve a predictive goal. It does not aim to quantify the past⁵, current or future impact of the Greens on German security and defence policy, but to shed light on one of its potential future factors of influence. It must identify the trajectory of a party that is likely, in the medium term, to play a major role in the military sphere. To understand how a party is positioned in general, or, in this case, as regards a specific public policy, we must examine the evolution of its ideological identity and strategy, the internal relationships of power and its interactions with the rest of the domestic system.

Three questions are of major importance: what political vision, i.e. its ideology, values and political attitudes, does this party, which is easily labelled as a peace party, develop on Defence issues? How does it develop this vision? What are its driving forces? The underlying question then emerges of how the party prepares both for election victory and exercising power in an area that has given rise to severe intra-party tensions at different times in its history.

- **Methodology and plan**

In this context, the material used first consisted of discursive and policy resources, which are easily accessible via numerous online documents available on websites of the party, MPs, the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the Bundestag.

As a party is not a disembodied reality regarding itself above all as a social relationship, the vital need to focus on the people who work in and for the party soon became apparent. About a dozen semi-structured interviews, whose results have been rendered anonymous, were conducted between January and March 2020 with individuals involved in the party's decision-making process. The interviewees were selected with the aim of gathering different points of view. Therefore, these people are or have been, during the past decade, members of parliament, staff members of the Bundestag parliamentary group, Bundestag members and federal leadership, or "simple" party members who have chosen to contribute to work on security topics at regional or national level. We also endeavoured to find a balance between representatives of the party's two main factions to avoid distorting the analysis.

An analysis of political parties has also fuelled our study. In this regard, work focusing on the Germany political landscape and the organisation of the Green party, its ideology and its voter base were particularly enlightening.

This work is organised into three parts. The first traces the loss of centrality of security and defence issues in the party's core ideology. The second focuses on the views currently advocated in terms of security and defence policy, and the last part then examines the decisive factors thereof.

⁵ This aspect has already been addressed in, *inter alia*: Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, "The 'Greening' of German Foreign Policy in the Iraq Case: Conditions of Junior Party Influence in Governing Coalitions", *Acta Politica*, September 2003, 38: 201-230.

1. Gradual loss of centrality of security and defence issues

To understand the current political vision of security and defence issues within a party like Alliance 90/The Greens, the place they hold must first be examined. This is no trivial question and requires an incursion into the past⁶ to measure the extent of the change.

1.1. *Pacifism: a constituent axiom of the party (1979-1983)*

The party, called "Die Grünen" up to the Reunification, formed at the end of the 1970s out of environmentalist and anti-nuclear citizen movements. These fairly conservative groups were gradually joined by feminists, extra-parliamentary left-wing groups and SPD and FDP dissidents. This coming together of heterogeneous ideological forces to say the least, benefitted from three driving forces: the environmentalist scene was keen to unite; with the revolutionary Leninist and Maoist models running out of steam, the alternative left was in search of a new forum of expression; and the social liberal policy pursued by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982) created a wave of frustration. The turning point undoubtedly came with the adoption of NATO's "double-track decision" on theatre nuclear forces (December 1979), which brought together opponents to both civil and military nuclear power, the heirs of a German democratic pacifist tradition and more radical supporters of neutrality rejecting the logic of blocs. "Die Grünen" (The Greens) was thus formed on 12 and 13 January 1980.

Pacifism was asserted as one of the party's cardinal values. It was confirmed as a fundamental principle as of the first federal programme (1980), which presented the green policy as "*ecological, social, democratic and non-violent*"⁷. While, against the backdrop of attacks by the Red Army Faction, this latter adjective can be regarded as a rejection of terrorism, it is also a means of expressing an aversion to military action and support for an active policy of peace. This value was expressed in several demands, which contributed to the strategy of political differentiation with all the other parties established at the time and featured at the top of electoral programmes: opposition to the basing of missiles in Europe; rebalancing of East-West and North-South relations; transcending traditional opposition; refusal of categories of thought such as military balance, areas of influence or deterrence; unilateral disarmament to instigate a multilateral process; rejection of nuclear strategy; reinforcement of the United Nations.

⁶ To trace the history, we used the party's programmes, all of which are available on the Heinrich-Böll Foundation website, and three monographs:

Andreas Pettenkofer, *Die Entstehung der grünen Politik. Kulturosoziologie der westdeutschen Umweltbewegung*, Campus Verlag, 2014.

Ludger Volmer, *Die Grünen und die Außenpolitik – ein schwieriges Verhältnis*, Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1998.

Steffen Schmuck-Soldan, *Der Pazifismus bei Bündnis 90/Die Grünen – Entwicklung und Stellenwert einer außenpolitischen Ideologie 1990-2000*, PhD thesis, Humboldt University, Berlin, 2004.

⁷ Translated by the author. "ökologisch, sozial, basisdemokratisch und gewaltfrei"

Note that the adjectives were already part of the "Die Grünen" programme for the European elections in 1979.

1.2. One-upmanship as the solution to conflicts and difficulties coping with a new strategic order (1984-1994)

In the mid-1980s, after making its entry into several regional parliaments (Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg and Hesse) and the Bundestag, the party found itself facing a dilemma. Either it joined forces with established parties in order to govern, or locked itself into an ideology and pattern of protest, like the "anti-party party" ("Antipartei-Partei") dreamt of by some⁸. In this context of integration, pacifism became an intensive corrosive theme and a power struggle issue. While it remained a key hallmark, it was harnessed by the different factions of the party (briefly, the "fundamentalists", called the "Fundis", and the "realists", also called the "Realos" mainly from the "Sponti" movement). This resulted not only in overemphasis on questions of international policy, but also in a radicalisation of positions.

On the one hand, the party's most anti-establishment components, which were better represented in federal governing bodies, took charge of drafting programmes and turned the initially nuclear pacifistic position into an all-out criticism of the military factor which reached its height with the rejection of NATO and the Bundeswehr. On the other hand, the advocates of a realist line sought to moderate and demonstrated their support for more conventional views of German foreign and defence policy, such as "Western integration" ("*Westbindung*"). They therefore moved closer to the social democrats, where peace causes were regaining momentum from the opposition benches.

The Reunification seemed to leave the Green party in complete disarray. The period that followed shows the extent to which "Die Grünen", by then united with the Eastern German citizen groups of "Bündnis 90", struggled to cope with the new order. The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the bipolar world order triggered virulent internal debates, but they did not, at least to begin with, fundamentally change the party's public position. Disarmament and the end of military blocs in Europe therefore ranked second in its priorities on the 1990 programme, behind the environment. The line failed to convince and the party did not win any seats in reunified Germany's first federal parliament.

1.3. Weakening of security and defence issues (1994 to the present day)

Faced with the spectre of disappearing from the political landscape, the party moved into a period of integration and reconstruction which saw the departure of its most radical figures. The change was underway. In the 1994 federal election programme, "greening" the economic and social system became a central aspect, relegating defence and security questions to the bottom of the list of concerns. This trend was fostered by persistent internal controversies over the advisability of maintaining an extreme pacifistic position, which was utopian in the context of the Yugoslav Wars.

⁸ Although this expression by Petra Kelly was long used to describe "Die Grünen", it has never actually met with consensus.

It is true that its participation in social democrat Gerhard Schröder's federal government (1998-2005)⁹ forced the party to clarify its position on use of military force when air strikes were launched on Serbia. The subject momentarily took on a spectacular new dimension with the convening of an extraordinary party congress in May 1999 (Bielefeld), held in a highly rowdy atmosphere and sparking off a second wave of member departures. The question resurfaced in 2007 in Göttingen, at the extraordinary congress held to decide on military deployment in Afghanistan. On this occasion, the delegates, representing the party's activist base, voiced their disapproval of extending Germany's participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), supported nonetheless by the party's leadership, and voted by majority for a rapid retreat from Afghan soil.

However, after these two grievous episodes, security and defence policy gradually disappeared from the core ideology of Alliance 90/The Greens: it became an area in which differences continued to be displayed, beyond the war in Kosovo, but it became a background issue. In fact, today, Alliance 90/The Greens no longer asserts the pacifist notion in its fundamental principles; henceforth, the battle revolves above all around the environment, social affairs, democracy and Europe¹⁰, largely following the terms of political competition set by the parties established since 1949.

2. A vision today between continued deradicalisation and ambiguity

The weakening of security and defence issues is not, however, synonymous with disengagement. To outline the current political vision, we will go back to the conceptual framework inspiring the Greens. Today, two poles emerge: the significance of the human security paradigm in the quest for peace, and a less controversial relationship with the military factor. The coexistence of the two is not trouble-free.

2.1. The mark of human security

The human security paradigm is still what essentially fuels the strategic thinking of Alliance 90/The Greens. The federal party office drummed it out in its resolution of 6 April 2018 designed to initiate work on a new fundamental programme ("*Grundsatzprogramm*")¹¹, and the active members and elected representatives interviewed for this study all spoke of it: protecting people is the cornerstone of the Green party's lasting peace plan. The party therefore adopts a broad view of threats and vulnerabilities. It is particularly concerned about the human consequences of power rivalry and conflicts, political violence, economic turmoil and injustice, and climate change.

⁹ Joschka Fischer, also representative of the realist wing, held office as Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Wofür wir kämpfen" – <https://www.gruene.de/programm> (consulted on 12 March 2020).

¹¹ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Neue Zeiten. Neue Antworten, Beschluss des Bundesvorstands*, 6 April 2018.

Thus, establishing peace and security primarily means giving priority to civilian crisis prevention and eliminating the structural causes of conflicts. While this demand can no longer be seen as the hallmark of a "counter-discourse", given the extensive integration and use of the idea of preventive diplomacy by security institutions, it is still the object of intense efforts by Alliance 90/The Greens. This focus is not limited to election periods; it is a matter of concern throughout the duration of parliaments. Each report on security issues, each new international crisis, and each review of a peacekeeping mission is taken as an opportunity to keep the topic on the national and European political agenda. The party asserts the advantages of prevention strategies and recalls the need to fulfil the commitments made in a specific action plan in 2004¹². To push the point home in the Bundestag, it employs a whole array of tools, ranging from mere mention in debates to leading specific discussions in a dedicated sub-committee¹³ created in 2009 by Green MPs, to introducing resolutions or questions to the government on the issue. Between 1999 and the end of 2019, this latter aspect represented around 15% of the writings produced by the party's parliamentary group.

This process can also be seen in the European Parliament where a preventive approach is recommended every inch of the way in the institutional calendar. For Green MPs from Germany, the annual review of the Report on implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an opportunity to not only insist on the importance of the civilian dimension of this European policy, but also to demand a bigger investment in the prevention of conflicts. Despite the renewal of MEPs, there is long-term continuity in the formulation of amendments to the report¹⁴. Negotiations on the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP, 2014-2020) also illustrate the pugnacity of German green representatives in Brussels and Strasbourg: in 2013, through Reinhard Bütikofer, rapporteur to the European Parliament on the issue, they recommended doubling funds allocated to prevention¹⁵. Support for military players was not part of this intention; it was the whole aim of the opposition to introducing Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) when the mechanism was revised in 2016-2017¹⁶.

To Alliance 90/The Greens, fostering peace and security also requires making better use of cooperative security. Reinforcing multilateralism is of vital importance here. Building on the principle that the security of people is the main aim and that security problems transcend national sovereignty, international and regional organisations are regarded as the best framework for action. Two of them are favoured by the Greens: the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), which, in the rhetoric, has ended up replacing the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). For the former, they call for improving its ability to defend the principle of "Responsibility to protect", by reinforcing its resources and

¹² Aktionsplan Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung.

¹³ Unterausschuss Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktbearbeitung und vernetztes Handeln.

¹⁴ E.g. European Parliament, "Amendment 3 Reinhard Bütikofer, Franziska Katharina Brantner on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group", A7-0026/3, 3 March 2010.

European Parliament, "Amendments 1 – 326. Draft report Arnaud Danjean (PE641.445v02-00) Implementation of the common security and defence policy – annual report 2018 (2019/2135(INI))", 12 November 2019.

¹⁵ Cf. Procedure 2011/0413(COD) of the European Parliament.

¹⁶ Die Grünen / EFA im Europäischen Parlament, "EU-Konfliktprävention. Umschichtung in militärische Projekte inakzeptabel", press release, 5 July 2016.

adopting more egalitarian governance. The ambition for the latter is to make it a global player in climate protection, human rights and a fairly regulated digital revolution¹⁷. Power relationships between States within organisations are not overlooked, and are seen above all as an obstacle to effective multilateralism.

The Green party's line emphasises two sources of crises: human rights violations, and weapons, regarded primarily for their potential to undermine European and international security. As a result, non-proliferation strategies are the second major focus of their proposals. Refusal of nuclear is not refuted, particularly in a context of the modernisation of arsenals and weakened arms control regimes. However, the spectrum of green demands in the area is today reduced. They only truly insist on the introduction of an international legal standard banning nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons based in Germany and verbal support for bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations. The terms of implementation are seldom detailed in collective documents, except, no doubt, for the statements of the working group, *Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Internationales (BAG Frieden und Internationales)*¹⁸, some of whose members also campaign for the *International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN)* movement. This stylization of their proposals substantially mitigates the provocative dimension, already altered by the adoption of "abolitionist" positions by other parties (SPD, Die Linke). In the same vein, we will note the confidential reply from Alliance 90/The Greens to the proposal made by Rolf Mützenich, leader of the social democrat parliamentary group, to end Germany's participation in NATO's nuclear sharing¹⁹: the reaction mainly consisted of an interview with Agnieszka Brugger, vice-chair of the green parliamentary group and member of the party's left-wing coordination committee (*Grün.Links.Denken*), in the alternative leftist daily newspaper *TAZ*²⁰, and a parliamentary motion reflecting the views of the SPD²¹. However, the issue is not included in the draft fundamental programme²².

At the same time, brandishing fear of a global arms race and military uses contrary to international law, especially humanitarian, Alliance 90/The Greens is in the vanguard of non-acquisition of armed drones by the Bundeswehr and the prohibition of lethal autonomous weapons, which it describes as "killer robots" in communiqués, following the example of the Human Rights Watch "*Stop Killer Robots*" international campaign. This cause is supported at various levels, both by members elected to the Bundestag²³ and MEPs²⁴ or the party's youth

¹⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Veränderung im Zuversicht. Zwischenbericht zum Grundsatzprogramm für den Konvent am 29./30. März 2019*, March 2019, pp. 33-34.

¹⁸ Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Internationales, "Nukleare Abrüstung – JETZT", Antrag der BAG Frieden & Internationales für die Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz, 14 September 2019.

¹⁹ Rolf Mützenich, "Plädoyer für eine notwendige und ehrliche sicherheitspolitische Debatte", *IPG-Journal.de*, 7 May 2020.

²⁰ Daniel Godeck, "Wie aus dem Kalten Krieg", *TAZ*, 5 May 2020.

²¹ Deutscher Bundestag, *Nukleare Teilhabe – Atomwaffen aus Deutschland abziehen (Antrag)*, Drucksache 19/20065, 16 June 2020.

²² Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "zu achten und zu schützen". *Veränderung schafft Halt. Grundsatzprogrammmentwurf*, 26 June 2020.

²³ Deutscher Bundestag, *Für einen VN-Verbotsvertrag – Völkerrechtliche Ächtung autonomer Waffensysteme unterstützen (Antrag)*, Drucksache 19/10637, 5 June 2019.

²⁴ European Parliament, "Motion for a resolution to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy pursuant to Rule 123(2) of the Rules of Procedure on autonomous weapon systems (2018/2752(RSP))", Reinhard Bütikofer, Bodil

movement²⁵. In the same vein, the objective of restricting arms trade and military spending continues to prevail within the party. Regarding arms export control more specifically, the demands are relatively stable, calling for a ban on transactions with dictators and countries in conflict areas. Here, two levels of action can be distinguished. On a national scale, after securing the reinforcement of the "Political principles of the Federal Government for the Export of War Weapons and other Military Equipment" in 2000, the Greens argue in favour of greater transparency in the decision process²⁶ and more extensive post-shipment control ("*Endverbleib-Kontrolle*")²⁷. But they above all demand, through MP Katja Keul, the adoption of a specific law placing arms exports in an exclusively restrictive framework and more stringent rules ("*Rüstungsexportkontrollgesetz*")²⁸. In the European Parliament, Alliance 90/The Greens MEPs, especially Hannah Neumann²⁹, also recommend "monitoring and controlling" compliance with the criteria defined in the Common Position defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (2008). Europeanization of export control is now put forward as the logical consequence of the Europeanization of production³⁰. This proposal primarily reflects fear of seeing German manufacturers circumvent national rules through armaments cooperation, a fear reinforced by the Franco-German Agreement of 23 October 2019 on defence export controls, regarded as weakening the current national regime³¹.

2.2. *Conditional acceptance of armed forces*

Nonetheless, this conception of peace is still less exclusive of the armed forces. Although, in the collective psyche, Alliance 90/The Greens is sometimes associated with Die Linke in matters of international defence and security policy, it has followed a totally different pathway to the extreme left-wing party, ultimately coming closer to the traditional government parties (CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP). Of course, some promoters of the "social defence" concept ("*Soziale Verteidigung*"), with reference to Petra Kelly's proposals, can still be found among the grassroots. And it is also true that many active members find it difficult to talk of defence other than in protest, and the existence of a defence policy³² is barely

Valero, Max Andersson, Barbara Lochbihler, Monika Vana, Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE group", B8-0308/2018, 5 September 2018.

²⁵ Grüne Jugend, "Stop killer robots. Autonome Waffensysteme verhindern und weltweit ächten" – <https://gruene-jugend.de/stop-killer-robots-autonome-waffensysteme-verhindern-und-weltweit-aechten/> (consulted on 13 March 2020).

²⁶ In 2014, MPs Katja Keul, Claudia Roth and Hans-Christian Ströbele had also applied to the Federal Constitutional Court seeking a right to information for MPs. Cf. Bundesverfassungsgericht, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 21. Oktober 2014, 2 BvE 5/11 –, Rn. 1-232, 21 October 2014.

²⁷ The procedure, decided in 2015 and inspired by the Swiss model, is still in the pilot phase and limited to small arms, guns and assault rifles in "third countries".

²⁸ NB: unlike Greenpeace Deutschland, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen does not publish draft laws.

²⁹ Currently rapporteur on the implementation of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.

³⁰ European Parliament, *Draft report on arms exports: implementation of common position 2008/944/CFSP*, 2020/2003(INI), 1 April 2020.

Alexandra Brzozowski, "SEDE rapporteur: EU badly needs common rules, transparency in arms export", *Euractiv*, 29 May 2020.

³¹ Interview of 31 January 2020.

³² The Defence parts of election programmes can be found in the section on peace, human rights, freedom and world justice.

asserted. But, quite clearly, the principle of a non-military security policy is no longer publicly supported by the party's representatives. The central question shaping the official line is not whether the armed forces are acceptable, but the circumstances in which they are. Three requirements of the Green party can be distinguished.

The first relates to ethical guidance of the armed forces. The integration of the military institution into Germany's contemporary democratic regime is a recurring concern. It reflects fear of a rise in anti-constitutional patriotism in both society and the army and, more latently, fear of a revival of German militarism. Therefore, the challenge not only lies in defending the Bundeswehr's subjection to parliamentary scrutiny or reasserting the relevance of the Bundeswehr's founding principles³³, such as "*Innere Führung*"³⁴, but in demanding action by Federal government to fight right-wing extremism³⁵.

The second requirement concerns management. While the party lacks a clearly defined list of missions to be assigned to the military, Alliance 90/The Greens has adopted two recurring issues in German defence policy: the level of equipment of the armed forces and the lack of appeal of engaging in military service. Hence, performance of public spending has become the main angle of attack for the party and its elected members. Whereas the electoral programme in 2013 still emphasised the insufficiency of military contribution to the budget consolidation effort³⁶, the party has changed its stand in parallel to the improvement in national public finance and the government's move to build up the capacity of the Bundeswehr since 2014. The environmentalist party's arguments now focus mostly on criticising the poor budget practices of the Federal Minister of Defence. As underlined in the programme for the legislative elections in 2017, it considers that resources are inappropriately allocated mainly to satisfy specific interests and because industrial policy considerations prevail over strategic principles³⁷. Consequently, the party's elected representatives, starting with Tobias Lindner, member of the Bundestag Defence and Budget commissions, regularly criticise the idea of substantially increasing military credits – particularly to reach a target 2% of GDP – and boosting the size of the Bundeswehr to more than 180,000 men. Conversely, they insist on the importance of aiming for quality, by better prioritising spending, reforming procurement procedures and abandoning the development and acquisition of programmes considered out of date³⁸. The party particularly targets the tactical air defence system (TLVS – *Taktisches Luftverteidigungssystem*), developed from the MEADS (*Medium Extended Air Defence System*) which already met with the party's wrath between 1998 and 2005³⁹.

³³ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017. Zukunft wird aus Mut gemacht*, June 2017, p. 87.

³⁴ NB: the "*Innere Führung*", literally meaning internal leadership, is the philosophical regulation of the Bundeswehr. It defines German servicemen as "citizens in uniform" and establishes democracy and respect for human dignity as fundamental values of military action.

³⁵ Deutscher Bundestag, *Rechtsextremen Netzwerken entschlossen entgegentreten (Antrag)*, Drucksache 19/19041, 16 October 2019.

³⁶ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Bundestagswahlprogramm 2013. Zeit für den grünen Wandel*, April 2013, p. 309.

³⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017. Zukunft wird aus Mut gemacht*, June 2017, p. 87.

³⁸ Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenographischer Bericht. 111. Sitzung*, 11 September 2019, pp. 13685-13686.

³⁹ Martin Agüera, *Worum streiten Sie eigentlich? Deutschlands Rüstungspolitik während der rot-grünen Regierungskoalition 1998-2005 an den Beispielen MEADS und A400M*, Peter Lang, 2007.

The party's last main requirements concern use of military force. Alliance 90/The Greens managed to overcome its internal conflict over pacifism and militarism by deciding to assess any intervention by the armed forces according to three key criteria. Today, a military operation is considered legitimate when all other solutions have failed ("*Ultima ratio*") and it is carried out under a UN Security Council mandate (UNSC). It must also involve the protection of human rights. Far from making a complete turnabout or standardising its position, the Green party has actually taken advantage of the "fair war" doctrine, as a result of its difficulty shouldering the legacy of Joschka Fischer's international policy, especially his decision to intervene in Kosovo without a UNSC resolution⁴⁰. In this context, any reference to anti-terrorist missions or defending national interests is still complicated. Justifying overseas deployment of the Bundeswehr on humanitarian grounds is always more likely to win support from green MPs⁴¹, and this is clear to see from the positions they have adopted during the current parliament (see table below). Yet, this inflexible, formalistic line is no longer unanimously approved and it comes under criticism in intra-party negotiations⁴² and in circles close to the party⁴³. Considering it little suited to the reality of crises and UN functioning, and liable to harm victims of conflicts, some call for greater flexibility in the definition and application of prerequisites, particularly in respect of EU missions⁴⁴.

**Votes by the Alliance 90/The Greens parliamentary group
for Bundeswehr deployment mandates in 2020**

Mission	Yes	No	Abstention	Absence	Position of parliamentary group representative	Main justification of the parliamentary group representative
EU NavFor Atalante	20	7	32	8	For	Protection of World Food Programme ships
EU NavFor Med Irini	0	5	53	9	Against	Problem of training and cooperation with Libyan coastguards
EUTM Mali	0	5	55	7	Against	No common European strategy. Human rights violation in Chad
FINUL	61	2	2	2	For	Contribution to security in Lebanon and the region
KFOR	60	2	4	1	For	Support for a mission having a UN mandate and suitability of KFOR in light of the security situation

⁴⁰ Interview of 31 January 2020.

⁴¹ NB: in this area, there is no parliamentary group discipline.

⁴² Interview of 31 January and 2 February 2020.

⁴³ Sophia Besch, Gerrit Kurtz, Sarah Brockmeier, Tobias Bunde, Robin Schroeder, *Die Zukunft von Auslandseinsätzen*, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Forum Neue Sicherheitspolitik, Impulspapier No. 1, April 2020.

⁴⁴ Interview of 31 January 2020.

Mission	Yes	No	Abstention	Absence	Position of parliamentary group representative	Main justification of the parliamentary group representative
MINUAD	60	1	0	6	For	Support for UN missions and defence of human rights
MINUSMA	50	3	5	9	For	Contribution to the peace process, national dialogue and disarmament/militia reintegration initiatives
MINUSS	61	1	0	5	For	Support for the peace process and defence of refugee/displaced populations
Resolute Support	17	28	12	10	For	Solidarity with the Afghan people and help with the country's reconstruction
Sea Guardian	0	62	0	5	Against	Issue of human rights in some countries in the Mediterranean region

Source: Deutscher Bundestag

2.3. The paradoxes

There are, however, certain paradoxes that the current line only partially solves. One obvious mismatch is no doubt defence industry issues, which are at the centre of a dispute between military modernisation and disarmament. Today, Alliance 90/The Greens MPs recognise the need to acquire new armaments, ideally in cooperation. Moreover, contrary to past views that placed emphasis on the civil conversion of the arms industry, they agree on the need for a European defence industry⁴⁵. They demand a position devoid of dogma on the allocation of budget resources⁴⁶, openness to discussions on arms exports⁴⁷ and support for European competitive bidding in public defence contracts, in order to challenge the national oligopolies considered detrimental to the performance of the armed forces⁴⁸.

However, this position coexists alongside a persistent rejection of funding arrangements for armament programmes such as the European Defence Fund (EDF). During the programme preparation phase, the Green party in the European Parliament, then led by Reinhard Bütikofer, was clearly opposed to seeing a defence industry component develop in European policies. It was presented as a "gift to manufacturers" to the detriment of the efficiency of the CSDP⁴⁹. Today, via Michael Bloss, shadow rapporteur for the dossier, the group is keen to

⁴⁵ Interviews of 31 January and 2 February 2020.

⁴⁶ Interview of 2 February 2020.

⁴⁷ Interviews of 6 December 2019 and 31 January 2020.

⁴⁸ Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenographischer Bericht*, 143. Sitzung, Plenarprotokoll 19/143, 30 January 2020, pp. 17936-17937.

⁴⁹ Die Grünen / EFA im Europäischen Parlament, "Programm zur Förderung der Europäischen Rüstungsindustrie. Geschenke für die Rüstungsindustrie", press release, 21 February 2018.

gain a place in the European Parliament's decision process and trigger an ethical debate⁵⁰. In comparison, the parliamentary group appears to have adopted more conciliatory positions in the Bundestag: while criticism of the EDF initially focused on fear of seeing civilian budgets diverted to the military⁵¹, it was subsequently limited to demanding the explicit exclusion of lethal autonomous weapons systems⁵². The fact that this point has been taken into account is a source of relative satisfaction⁵³. But on a broader scale, the mere mention of the EDF to green activists provokes a classic economic argument from advocates of disarmament: the money would be better spent in other sectors such as fighting climate change, development aid or civilian crisis prevention⁵⁴. This line of reasoning, used for example by Michael Bloss during the elections of green candidates for the European elections and in his election campaign⁵⁵, would appear successful both with party members and a chunk of the electorate.

The question of European military development, of central importance in the environmentalists' opinions, also represents a paradox. A compromise to support the military component of the CSDP in its current configuration is emerging. In its programme for the May 2019 European elections, Alliance 90/The Greens thus called for reinforced cooperation between the European armed forces. The CSDP is regarded as a means for Europeans to ensure their security. Furthermore, stronger European cooperation would be an opportunity to achieve two of the party's other goals, i.e. reduce national military spending and disarmament in Europe. However, the message becomes blurred when the question of integration is addressed. In texts and speeches delivered in parliament, the principle of the method is officially supported. Pooling and sharing capacities, via initiatives such as the German/Netherlands Corps or the Permanent Structured Cooperation, are explicitly commended and encouraged. The latest institutional reforms are accepted, provided that the requirement of scrutiny by the European Parliament is respected and that, as mentioned above, the civilian-military balance of the CSDP is preserved. The political objective of achieving European strategic autonomy has even become a hallmark of the line adopted by the party's current leaders, particularly Annalena Baerbock.

⁵⁰ Alexandra Brzozowski, "Faced with defence budget threats, EU eyes new money sources", *Euractiv*, 12 November 2019.

European Parliament, "Setting the preconditions for parliamentary scrutiny of actions co-funded by the European Defence Fund, in particular the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP)", Question for written answer E-000948/2020/rev.1 to the Commission, Rule 138, Michael Bloss (Greens/ALE), 18 February 2020.

⁵¹ Doris Wagner, "EU-Verteidigungsfonds: Keine zivilen Gelder für die Rüstungsindustrie", press release, 7 June 2017.

⁵² Deutscher Bundestag, *Keine Förderung Letaler Autonomer Waffensysteme durch den Europäischen Verteidigungsfonds (Antrag)*, Drucksache 19/5895, 20 November 2018.

⁵³ Deutscher Bundestag, *Für einen VN-Verbotsvertrag – Völkerrechtliche Ächtung autonomer Waffensysteme unterstützen (Antrag)*, Drucksache 19/10637, 5 June 2019, p. 2.

⁵⁴ Interview of 10 February 2020.

⁵⁵ Until recently, a post on his personal website read (<https://www.michaelbloss.eu/friedlich> consulted on 17 January 2020): "ich will [dieses Privileg] nutzen, um dem Aufrüsten, den militärischen Machtspielen und Aggressoren dieser Welt ein lautes Nein und konkrete Alternativen entgegenzusetzen. [...] Im Europäischen Parlament werde ich mich dafür einsetzen, dass keine europäischen Gelder in Rüstungsforschung oder Militär gesteckt werden und die Mittel für die zivile Krisenprävention verdoppelt werden" (translation: "I want to use [this privilege] to object to rearmament, military power games and the aggressors of this world with a loud "no" and concrete alternatives. [...] In the European Parliament, I will advocate that no European money be put into military research or the armed forces and that the funds for civilian crisis prevention be doubled").

However, the policy line continues to waver between inter-government cooperation and integration, suggesting the extent of the attract/repulse phenomenon that the idea of common European defence creates among active members⁵⁶. It therefore avoids making the slightest reference to a "European Army", which is enough to inflame any internal discussion, like the dispute that broke out in 2015 between MPs Tobias Lindner and Cem Özdemir⁵⁷, and MEPs Reinhard Bütikofer and Frithjof Schmidt⁵⁸. The interim report drafted for the preparation of the next fundamental programme is, in this regard, another example of the party's difficulty in settling the debate. It unintelligibly combines a Federalist vision, concern to take a practical approach and fear of contributing to militarisation of the European peace plan, also potentially ill-managed by the elected democratic bodies.⁵⁹

The relationship with the Atlantic Alliance is also ambiguous. Alliance 90/The Greens has aligned its views with the dominant German conception that the transatlantic organisation forms the basis of national defence policy. However, the message is undermined by the way it is treated: in the programmes, NATO systematically comes in last position and in concise terms. This choice tends to confirm the impression of embarrassment at discussing the topic. The unease is all the more apparent when the party expresses views on the Alliance's military stance since the summits of Newport (2014) and Warsaw (2016). The motion introduced by the Bundestag parliamentary group on the occasion of the organisation's 70th anniversary illustrates this reality. The text meanders between support for certain somewhat casually named aspects of the Readiness Action Plan and desire to assert Germany's opinions in the organisation, while blaming Russia, and the Allies, for contributing to destabilising regional security. It ends by calling for a new architecture of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security. It also carefully avoids any reference to the concept of deterrence, even though it underpins NATO's current approach.⁶⁰ When defended at the plenary session by Jürgen Trittin⁶¹, the fragile equilibrium was nonetheless shaken by completely excluding all mention of the assurance and adaptation measures: collective defence becomes a means of preventing, among the members of the Alliance, any attempt to go it alone in military matters⁶². But this last example again reflects both the ability to unite different groups with conflicting positions under the same banner year after year, and a tribunicial and therefore quite limited expression of radical postures. This naturally raises questions as to the reasons behind this approach.

More generally, an examination of the key factors of the Green party's current vision of security and defence issues clearly reveals its concern to continue conforming to a pacifistic

⁵⁶ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Europas Versprechen erneuern. Europawahlprogramm 2019*, November 2018, p. 141. Deutscher Bundestag, *Impulse für eine gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union (Antrag)*, Drucksache 19/10185, 15 May 2019.

Interviews of 10 February, 11 February and 6 March 2020.

⁵⁷ Tobias Lindner, Cem Özdemir, "Zum Frieden vereint – Ein Plädoyer für mehr Europa in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik", March 2015.

⁵⁸ Frithjof Schmidt, Reinhard Bütikofer, "Die Legende von der Europäischen Armee", April 2015.

⁵⁹ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Veränderung im Zuversicht. Zwischenbericht zum Grundsatzprogramm für den Konvent am 29./30. März 2019*, March 2019, pp. 34-35.

⁶⁰ Deutscher Bundestag, *70 Jahre NATO (Antrag)*, Drucksache 19/8879, 3 April 2019.

⁶¹ Leader of the green parliamentary group from 2009 to 2013.

⁶² Deutscher Bundestag, *Stenographischer Bericht. 92. Sitzung*, Plenarprotokoll 19/92, 4 April 2019, pp. 10919-10920.

ideal, but also its permeability to the dominant norms in force in Germany. In other words, we are today seeing its pacifistic fundamentals combine with gradual acceptance of the permanent features of German foreign and defence policy, shifting this party of values and concepts towards a moderate line, albeit without any clear limits, due to a lack of any real homogeneous thinking. However, acknowledging this change is not sufficient. We need to understand how it is made possible.

3. Understanding the moderation: A look at the internal functioning of the party

To comprehend how Alliance 90/The Greens is moderating its line and, thus, to go beyond a mere interpretation of the phenomenon, two consubstantial aspects of the party must be examined: its internal functioning and its interaction with the rest of the German political fabric. We will therefore focus more particularly on the plan spearheaded by the current national office (*Bundesvorstand*) to place Alliance 90/The Greens at the centre of the national scene, a plan that heightens the need to iron out disputes and radical stances.

3.1. *Embodying a new political centre force*

The moderation seen on defence matters makes perfect sense when it is viewed in conjunction with the party's general strategy and the way it presents itself. For over a decade, Alliance 90/The Greens has been adapting, to grow from a small to a medium-size party occupying the middle ground. It is therefore seeking to create a better power relationship with the so-called people's parties (SPD and Union) and outclass parties defending specific interests like the FDP (market radicalism), Die Linke (maximisation of social justice) or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, national populism). This ambition, which was already palpable in the past in the action of certain members of the parliamentary group and the national office (*Bundesvorstand*)⁶³, gained ground with the election of the leading tandem Annalena Baerbock-Robert Habeck in January 2018 and their re-election in November 2019 for two more years. These representatives of the realist faction are keen to speed up the change to the party's image and identity. In both their discourse and positions, they display their dual aim of avoiding being likened to a protest force and offering a bold, credible and unifying alternative.

Robert Habeck, born 2 September 1969

Education: philosophy, German philology and linguistics

Occupation: novelist and essayist

Political career: joined Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in 2002; leader of the green parliamentary group in the Schleswig-Holstein Landtag (2009-2012); Schleswig-Holstein State Minister for Energy, Agriculture and the Environment (2012-2018); joint party leader (since 2018).

Annalena Baerbock, born 15 December 1980

⁶³ For example, Renate Künast (joint parliamentary group leader from 2005 to 2013), Cem Özdemir (joint leader from 2008 to 2018) or Katrin Göring-Eckhardt (joint leader of the parliamentary group since 2013 and former joint lead candidate in the 2013 federal elections).

Education: politics and law

Career: MEP staff member (2005-2008); advisor on foreign and security policies for the green party parliamentary group in the Bundestag (2008-2009).

Political career: joined Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in 2005; member of the executive board of Brandenburg (since 2008); member of the Bundestag since 2009; joint party leader since 2018.

They therefore refute the idea that protest is the main driver of the party's policy line. This refusal consists of rejecting the description as an "anti party" ("*Dagegen-Partei*"). It is also displayed through active and asserted participation in events held in contempt by anti-establishment forces. In February 2020, Annalena Baerbock was a one of the leading German speakers at a round-table meeting organised by the BDI, one of Germany's main employer federations, as part of the Munich Security Conference⁶⁴. The joint executive team clearly displays their openness to dialogue and to assuming responsibilities in the country's management, calling themselves the formulating party ("*Gestaltungspartei*")⁶⁵ and alliance party ("*Bündnispartei*").

But Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck go even further. They support a change in the party's position on the political arena, moving away from the left. The current joint leaders are attempting to develop and are gradually honing a centrist project. Initially designed with a view to becoming the main centre-left force in Germany, it is now shedding the socialistic talk and any reference to the traditional left/right divide, thereby rendering it obsolete.⁶⁶ The centrist idea being introduced focuses on an ideological alternative, driving a transformation of Germany towards an eco-social market economy ("*sozial-ökologische Marktwirtschaft*")⁶⁷. Here, transformative talk rhymes with human freedom and dignity, controlled economic liberalism, security, mainly understood as precaution, and uniting society⁶⁸. Furthermore, although Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock had envisioned the new fundamental programme as a manifesto that would bring an end to the traditional verbose form of programmes⁶⁹, they do not regard themselves as an avant-garde group. The reform of the party is, conversely, based on majority, reality and pragmatism. In fact, it combines the two concepts of "*alte Mitte*" and "*neue Mitte*" respectively upheld in the past by the Christian Democrats and the Social Democratic Party⁷⁰, signalling an ability to adapt. This could already be seen in the exploratory talks held to form a federal government with the conservatives and liberals in autumn 2017, like the topic of armed drones which did not explicitly fit in with the green negotiators' red lines⁷¹.

⁶⁴ The main German peace movements voice their support for the counter-conference, the Anti-War Conference ("*Antikriegs-Kongress*").

⁶⁵ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Neue Zeiten. Neue Antworten, Beschluss des Bundesvorstands*, 6 April 2018.

⁶⁶ Mike Schier, Georg Anastasiadis, "Die Mitte sind wir!" – Grünen-Chef Robert Habeck im Interview über seine Partei", [merkur.de](https://www.merkur.de), 16 June 2019.

Ansgar Graw, "Grüne Neuvermessung der Mitte", *Die Welt*, 24 February 2020.

⁶⁷ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Für Wirtschaft, die sich neu erfindet – Hamburg zeigt den Weg*, Beschluss des Bundesvorstands, Berlin, 6 January 2020.

Petra Pinzler, Bernd Ulrich, "Im vollen Lauf erwischt", *Die Zeit*, 23 April 2020.

⁶⁸ Press conference held to present the draft fundamental programme, 26 June 2020.

⁶⁹ Interview of 6 March 2020.

⁷⁰ Charlotte Chevallier Bellon, *Essai d'interprétation des phénomènes centristes contemporains : analyse comparative : France, Allemagne, Pologne*, PhD thesis, Paris VIII Vincennes-Saint Denis University, 2006.

⁷¹ *Ergebnis der Sondierungsgespräche zwischen CDU/CSU, FDP und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, 15 November 2017, p. 55.

Today, playing the centrist card allows the party to modify the terms of national party competition⁷² and become the unifying banner of a fragmented, polarised political arena in which it was merely a back-up force in 1998 and 2017. The current centrist strategy primarily gives Alliance 90/The Greens an opportunity to assert itself as the safeguard of the system, objecting to the rise in extremism, particularly the AfD. But, by saying it is centrist, the party also affirms that it wants to be in the centre and therefore occupy an almost vacant point of convergence. Faced with considerable erosion of their activist and electoral base in favour of other parties, the major parties are turning away from the centre and seeking to deepen the differences between them to create room for identification and mobilisation. This phenomenon can be seen within the SPD with the election of Norbert Walter-Borjans and Saskia Eskens to the head of the party and the nomination of Rolf Mützenich as leader of the parliamentary group, indicating a move to the left. The situation is less clear in the CDU. Several candidates to succeed Angela Merkel and Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (particularly Armin Laschet and Friedrich Merz) remain firmly in the centre in their rhetoric, while pushing their line to the right.

Whatever the outcome of the battle for the centrist label, the identity change allows Alliance 90/The Greens to pursue a flexible political strategy, so as to be more than just one party among others in the federal multi-polar competition and avoid getting entangled in a given policy of alliance, as already undertaken at regional level. By moving to the centre and reducing the ideological gap with the conservative and liberal parties, it will be able to maximise its participation in cooperative approaches, essential to form a coalition government in Germany, particularly since its transition from a two-party to a multi-party system. The power balances for 2021 are not established and it is therefore preparing for all configurations after the ballot. It is prepositioned to become "kingmaker" of various coalition scenarios, like the FDP under the Bonn Republic, or even the pivotal pole of a coalition. This green strategy has clearly been understood by the Union, since Alliance 90/The Greens is regarded as a major rival⁷³ and all the stated or presumed candidates to the Federal Chancellery welcome the idea of a black-green government⁷⁴.

Interview of 17 February 2020.

⁷² Cf. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, *Parteien*, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 46–47/2018, 12 November 2018.

Jérôme Vaillant, "L'évolution du système des partis : du tripartisme d'antan au pluripartisme d'aujourd'hui", *Allemagne d'aujourd'hui*, vol. 232, no. 2, 2020, pp. 153-176.


⁷³ "Für Armin Laschet sind die Grünen der größte Konkurrent", *FAZ.net*, 29 December 2019.

⁷⁴ Ibid. "CSU-Chef Söder erwägt schwarz-grüne Koalition", *Spiegel Online*, 26 February 2020.

"Merz empfiehlt sich als Wegbereiter für Schwarz-Grün", *Tagesspiegel*, 26 June 2020.

For his part, Norbert Röttgen has been in favour of a federal government with the Greens for more than a decade. Cf. Christoph Weckenbrock, *Schwarz-Grün für Deutschland? Wie aus politischen Erzfeinden Bündnispartner wurden*, Transcript-Verlag, 2017.

Change in the number of members of German political parties (2015-2019)



Sources: press data, Oskar Niedermayer 2019, Bündnis 90 Die Grünen

The election success of the party's new strategy will remain to be seen until autumn 2021. But it would already appear to have had a decisive effect on the party's membership, which has grown hugely since 2018. However, the rise in members, which is spectacular compared to the growth seen in other German parties (Graph above on the change in membership from 2015 to 2019), is such that it deserves to be mentioned. It suggests that the views currently defended to new members do, indeed, have appeal. But it says nothing about the leaders' actual ability to federate and mobilise a whole party marked by the existence of two major internal forces and asserting grassroots democracy as its working principle⁷⁵. This leads us to look into the party's internal regulation.

3.2. Managing the party machinery

Pursuing a strategy in the centre means the leaders must manage the party's machinery and, in this area, the executive of Alliance 90/The Greens has little room for manoeuvre. The leaders must exist alongside the Bundestag and European Parliament parliamentary groups, which each define their own line based, primarily, on their members' sensitivities. While this set-up explains the different political opinions between green parliamentary groups, it poses the problem of coordination between members of parliament and the party's central organisation.

⁷⁵ Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Grüne Regeln*, 25 April 2015, p. 38.

In addition, the joint leaders cannot openly challenge the norms established without reviving a conflict between the different wings of the party whose previous fratricidal experiences have shown the negative effects internally and even more so among voters. Therefore, they must first grapple with the rule of total consensus. The slightest stand taken by any party body, such as the parliamentary group, is indeed fiercely discussed. In a party in which a culture of writing prevails, each sentence is negotiated⁷⁶. The quest for consensual language is made even more difficult by the party's persistent bipolarisation. Although concealed by consistent external communication and by the election of two realist party leaders, the existence of two streams, one realist, the other left-wing, is still a decisive factor in daily operations. Each one strives for the best possible representation in top positions in the party and the parliamentary group, making the logic of balancing forces a key criterion in the allocation of posts⁷⁷, almost as important as the formal principle of gender equality. This duality is significantly reflected in the final version of the party's written productions which display a balanced cohabitation of different and sometimes conflicting visions, as we have seen above on defence issues. Consequently, any imbalance means that the prospect of an initiative is almost irremediably doomed.

The party's leadership must also take its active member base into account. Members of Alliance 90/The Greens have two main ways of expressing their opinions and influencing the party's directions. In addition to their role in nominating candidates for the different elections, the German Green party's active members elect, in their section of *Kreis* (equivalent to a district), one or more delegates who will vote for federal executives, programmes and resolutions in Federal congress (*Bundesversammlung* or *Bundesdelegiertenkonferenz*, BDK). They may also contribute to more technical work by being elected to the advisory working groups at regional (*Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft*, LAG) and federal level (*Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft*, BAG), or simply by taking part in their discussions. It is worth noting that the BAG can propose resolutions to the BDK. Most work on security and defence matters takes place within *BAG Frieden und Internationales*, consisting of two delegates per Land, one youth movement delegate (*Grüne Jugend*) and delegates of the Federal, European and regional parliamentary groups. As a result of the party's integration of new members who are less attentive to the ideal of peace and more interested in environmental issues and Europe⁷⁸, the level of activity of *BAG Frieden und Internationales* has declined. The tone of discussions has also changed and gradually calmed down. But the group, which today consists mainly of individuals close to the left-wing faction, sees itself as an alternative to the parliamentary group, whose work and, even more so, the ability of some of its members to compromise on the conditions for engaging the armed forces or the acquisition of military capacities are regarded with a critical eye⁷⁹.

As part of the rethink of the fundamental programme and preparations for upcoming elections, Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock face the challenge of ensuring that the bipolar and activist context does not hinder the centrist transformation. Internally, they endeavour to assert themselves as overseers. This can be seen, *inter alia*, in matters relating

⁷⁶ Interview of 11 and 17 February 2020.

⁷⁷ Niko Switek, *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Koalitionsentscheidungen in den Ländern*, Nomos Verlag, 2015, pp. 175-178.

⁷⁸ Interview of 31 January, 2 February and 11 February 2020.

⁷⁹ Interview of 5 and 11 February 2020.

to foreign policy and security. Annalena Baerbock who, according to the allocation of duties between the two leaders, has responsibility for follow-up, adopts an inclusive method, taking care to consult on a wide scale before making any statement⁸⁰. She therefore restricts her exposure to criticism within the party. At the same time, it helps her gain legitimacy in affairs of State and establish her authority, particularly vis-à-vis the powerful Bundestag parliamentary group which had taken credit for the initiative in this field. Annalena Baerbock's dual role as joint leader and member of parliament no doubt facilitates a more balanced sharing of roles between the national parliamentary group and the party's bodies.

Thanks to their popularity and their backing by the whole federal office⁸¹, the joint leaders also attempt to progress at their own pace while holding off the most "tension-provoking" points for as long as possible, as well as all ideological postures liable to restrict the search for coalition partners. A debate on security policy issues is therefore diverted, or at least postponed. The BDK held in November 2019 demonstrates this reality: the negotiations held before and during the Conference led to three resolutions instigated by *BAG Frieden und Internationales*⁸² being sidelined; they were initially included in Other Business on the agenda before gradually being squeezed out of the discussion. The development of the fundamental programme is also temporarily shielded from a direct confrontation of views. Although a dedicated working group of current and former MPs and active members was formed, the results of its reflection did not serve as a foundation for the preliminary draft (interim report "*Zwischenbericht*") or the draft presented on 26 June 2020. On the contrary, the federal office relied on a small team of permanent party employees for the writing process⁸³. This method not only reinforces the Green Party's professionalization and weakens the position of *BAG Frieden und Internationales*, it also reflects a change in the approach taken to internal divides. They are either left aside or reinterpreted depending on how they align with the goals of election success and winning a government position, but they are not consciously and resolutely resolved. Thus, in the coming months, Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock will need to make a big effort to educate and inform if their idea for compromise is to be durably acceptable to the grassroots and representatives or future candidates to the Bundestag. This is the only way they will manage to limit a surge of amendments to their strategy⁸⁴, and then secure extensive implementation of their policy line by MPs and thus avert the spectre of another internal breakdown.

Conclusion

To conclude, it is important to note that Alliance 90/The Greens' vision of security and defence policy has undergone profound change. Beyond the withdrawal from the protest scene and the de-ranking of defence and security issues in the hierarchy of concerns, the

⁸⁰ Interview of 6 March 2020.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Beschluss "Für die Bewahrung des Iran-Nuklearabkommens", Beschluss "Nukleare Abrüstung – JETZT", Beschluss "Unsere grüne Friedens- und Außenpolitik".

⁸³ Interviews of 5 February and 6 March 2020.

⁸⁴ NB: at the BDK, active members may also submit an alternative resolution ("*Globalalternative*") which could replace all or part of the texts proposed by the national office.

party is clearly pursuing a moderate line. In doing so, it is also seeking to strike a balance between different diverging conceptions, even though the gaps have narrowed internally. In this respect, the approach taken to defence and security issues suggests the political and sociological transformations that the party has seen since its first experience in government (1998-2005), and is seeing today with Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock, their election goals and the confirmed governmental vocation. It also reflects intra-party machinery marked by a persistent logic of views and complex interactions between the federal/MP/active member triangle.

Hence, the party's current line would appear to be in a tug-of-war between two poles: on the one hand, maintaining originality, displayed in its attachment to the human security paradigm and, on the other, the quest for a more inclusive identity, where pacifistic ideology gradually gives way to understanding management of military affairs. Nonetheless, many questions, such as its relationship with the EU or NATO, remain unresolved. While this should not influence its integration into government, it could be problematic in the exercise of power and be detrimental to the ambition to preserve the party's cohesion.

Therefore, and provided that Alliance 90/The Greens qualifies to participate in the next Federal coalition, two additional lines of analysis could be pursued: firstly, party-government relations and, secondly, the party's interactions with its coalition partners. Conversely, if it fails in the elections, the question arises of just how much the reorientations under way will be institutionalised or, on the contrary, undone.

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