Abstract
As the United States increases its strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific, NATO is confronting a nuclear inflection point – driven, inter alia, by the increasingly transactional nature of the Alliance. With mounting uncertainty over U.S. extended deterrence, European leaders face a pivotal question: should Europe pursue nuclear autonomy, or deepen its reliance on an increasingly distracted Washington? President Macron’s revived proposal to extend France’s nuclear umbrella, alongside Germany’s growing openness to alternative deterrence architectures, signals an evolving debate. Yet critical gaps in capacity, strategic doctrine, and political consensus persist. Meanwhile, Russia’s nuclear deployments in Belarus and China’s responsive posture add further complexity. This article, offering a non-Western perspective, analyzes NATO’s nuclear trajectory, assesses the viability of a Franco-British-European deterrent, and explores whether the Alliance can adapt to a multipolar nuclear order without fragmenting.