In a toughening geopolitical context, with much hanging also on the transition in the US, the months and years to come will certainly be difficult for China-Europe relations – just as this year has undoubtedly been.
Both China and the European Union enjoy anniversary years, and 2020, marking the 45th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, was meant to be a special one. From early 2019, Chinese government think-tanks and media started publishing lengthy reports
Despite China’s apparent enthusiasm, the “year of Sino-European friendship”
China and the EU: initial steps
Following the enlargement of the EU to 27 members in 2004
Although it has always officially declared its full respect
In 2015, the launch of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) illustrated China’s enduring ability to divide Europe,
Another major issue in the relationship has been the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a network of regional infrastructures started in 2013 that was initially aimed at the European continent, but which has now expanded into a global project. Among EU members, fifteen have signed BRI Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with China. At the second Belt and Road Forum organized in Beijing in April 2019, no less than 12 European heads of State and heads of governments attended, including those of Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Malta. Still, representatives of the European Commission took part without signing the final communiqué, while Germany’s minister of economy, Peter Altmaier, clarified the position of larger EU member states: “In the big EU states we have agreed that we don’t want to sign any bilateral memorandums but together make necessary arrangements between the greater European Economic Area and the economic area of Greater China,” he said.
Although China has pushed for more European support for BRI, EU institutions have been less than enthusiastic. It should also be noted that most Chinese foreign direct investments (FDI)
China has also continued to nurture its long-established bilateral relations with European countries. France and Germany have enjoyed fairly close relations with the People’s Republic, the former since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1964, the latter since 1972. The launch of China’s reform and opening policy in 1978 led to ever-tightening economic ties from the 1980s onward. This was especially true in the German case, with corporations such as Volkswagen or Siemens committing long-term investments to China. German technology and automobiles have been popular in China for several decades, which has translated into huge profits for German automakers especially.
The German government also built a reputation of sticking to an economic agenda (rather than “interfering in Chinese internal affairs” as Beijing would say), with the vastly unrealistic hope that China would eventually switch to a more open, if not more democratic system. Germany’s engagement approach to China, with a focus on trade, is termed “change through trade” (Wandel durch Handel) in German. Although this concept has come under increasing criticism, top politicians in Germany, including Peter Altmaier, Germany’s economic minister, have to date defended this approach.
As for France, President Charles de Gaulle’s early gesture of recognizing the People’s Republic in 1964
In another category of bilateral relationship with China are those EU countries that have been recipients of fairly large Chinese FDI in areas such as energy, port infrastructure, finance and transport. These include Greece and Portugal, both in southern Europe. Finally, there are those Eastern and Central European countries, formerly members of the socialist block, that China often regards as “old friends” (老朋友). These countries, including Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, belong in a category of their own – and many have been grouped by China in the aforementioned “17+1.”
New challenges
Despite this recent past of deepening ties, the last six months have been anything but smooth in China-EU relations. Following the European Commission’s release in March 2019 of its joint communication, “EU-China – a strategic outlook,”
In March 2020, as the Covid-19 epidemic spread to Europe, Brussels set new guidelines and temporary rules on financial take-over by non-EU actors,
These actions in Europe might have led Beijing to conclude that it could no longer take the soft European position for granted. But there is no evidence that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in any way adjusted its efforts to match this new situation. On the contrary, diplomats at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have apparently been empowered by the party leadership to be far more outspoken, a trend already described by some as “wolf warrior diplomacy”.
These actions in Europe might have led Beijing to conclude that it could no longer take the soft European position for granted. But there is no evidence that the Chinese Communist Party in any way adjusted its efforts to match this new situation.
The Covid-19 pandemic has certainly been a complicating factor in the EU-China relationship through 2020 – due in no small part to the CCP’s domestically-focused propaganda and nationalist agenda praising its efforts at home, often at the expense of European countries.
Whatever the impact of these narratives domestically, they have mostly backfired in European public opinion. According to the most recent global survey from Pew Research,
Clearly, though there are rare exceptions, notably Italy (in a modest way), China’s image has broadly suffered in Europe this year, corresponding with the spread of Covid-19 and the global response. This is true whether the issue is China and the EU, or China and its relationship to individual member-states.
Chinese diplomacy at play in Europe
In late August 2020, China’s two top diplomats, Politburo member Yang Jiechi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, staged a well-choreographed charm offensive to seven European countries.
The September summit, originally envisioned by German Chancellor Angela Merkel as a crowning event for Germany’s European Council presidency,
Following the meeting, Michel noted the EU’s grievances, and stressed that there must be mutual benefit and openness.
From the point of view of the Chinese, the summit was disappointing considering one of Beijing’s key objectives was to counter the creation of a slowly-building, united transatlantic front on China-related issues following multiple trips to Europe by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
There are high chances that strengthened transatlantic ties under the upcoming Biden Administration will reinforce the dialogue on China between the US and the EU.
Revealingly, the doubts and concerns voiced by EU leaders – topics ranging from forced technology transfers, IP theft and state subsidies, not to mention human right violations in Xinjiang and a controversial national security law in Hong Kong – were not reported in the Chinese media following the trips by Yang and Wang. Instead, coverage by the state-run news agency Xinhua
China’s discourse on “multilateralism” seems to be hitting a wall in Europe, which uses a very different definition. Beijing’s aim is to get full international recognition for its actions, without any foreign or supranational interferences in its internal matters, including in the way it is dealing with ethnic minorities or critics. It is trying to obtain approval from as many countries as possible while minimizing those critical countries. One example is its actions at the UN last July when it managed to get the support of 53 countries over its newly-introduced Hong Kong national security law, against 27 countries.
During and after the late summer Chinese diplomatic trips, European official comments reflected a majority view in favour of defending the EU’s rules-based core principles. This was especially the case with regard to the Czech Republic’s policy vis a vis Taiwan and the August visit by the Czech Senate’s president to the island, utterly denounced by Beijing.
Although China had an opportunity to capitalize this fall while the US faced a tough election period (not to mention Covid-19), it seems almost incomprehensible that its diplomacy was unable to grasp the risks and sensitivities of the European context.
Where to go from here?
China’s two-fold approach towards the EU and member-states has thus far been unsuccessful. Although top Chinese diplomats managed to secure meetings with the French president, with the Spanish and Dutch prime ministers, and so on – always harping on the theme
To the contrary, there are now growing signs that the EU is moving toward a more unified position on China, on both economic matters and crucial political ones, like Hong Kong’s new national security law and China’s treatment of ethnic minority groups such as Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Tibetans and Mongols. In some EU countries, the weight of public opinion has become a factor feeding certain politicians’ discourse on China. For example, members of the Italian parliament hosted representatives
The European Parliament has also been very critical. In May 2016, it passed a resolution against granting China a market economy status,
Following the September 14 summit, the European Council published a strong statement reaffirming its March 2019 position and stressing “the need to rebalance the economic relationship and achieve reciprocity.”
Interestingly, the EU also encouraged China “to assume greater responsibility in dealing with global challenges.” It expressed the hope for more “ambitious action” on climate goals, in line with the Paris Agreement. It encouraged multilateral responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, particularly on treatments and vaccines, as well as an independent review of the international health response to Covid-19. Climate change in particular is one area where there are good prospects for cooperation between China and the EU. The EU statement, we should note, followed the announcement by President Xi during his video address to the United Nations that China aims to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. There are hopes in European policy circles, which the author has heard repeatedly in conversations with European officials, that climate and health will become issues of cooperation with the PRC in the months and years to come.
But behind the continued talk of cooperation, even as European officials are still officially calling for a meeting with Xi Jinping in 2021, their language has become less enthusiastic and more critical. In the same September statement following the virtual summit, for example, the European Council underlined its “serious concerns about the human rights situation in China, including developments in Hong Kong and the treatment of people belonging to minorities.”
These days, “impatience” and “frustration” seem to be the operative terms in European relations with China, whether the issue is trade and investment, humans rights, scientific cooperation, or more aggressive diplomatic tactics. Even in the area of climate change, where cooperation seems within reach, there is frustration with the way China has exploited fragmentary regulatory environments in the Western Balkans, right in the EU’s backyard, to push through polluting coal projects. There is growing fatigue with China’s promises and rhetoric. “China policy internally is becoming more totalitarian all the time,” Reinhard Bütikofer, the German MEP who chairs the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with China, told Euronews, “and its policy towards the outside world is becoming more aggressive all of the time.” Bütikofer urged a re-think of EU-China relations: “We tell China, we have had it with their win-win rhetoric.”
These concerns and more might have had a strong hearing at the European Council meeting scheduled for November 16, where the EU’s China policy was to top the agenda. However, the resurgence of Covid-19 in Europe has prompted Chancellor Merkel decided to call the meeting off. This is certainly not good news for those who aim to confront China on the issue of economic reciprocity as well as sensitive issues such as human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
In a toughening geopolitical context, with much hanging also on the outcome of the US elections, the months and years to come will certainly be challenging for China-Europe relations – just as this year has undoubtedly been. In areas like health and climate, there are hopes, and perhaps opportunities, for cooperation. But much will depend on the Beijing leadership, which has so far placed its domestic agenda above anything else, failing to hear the growing list of grievances across the continent. The CCP, which last month held its Fifth Plenum of the current party congress, is very much focused on its hundredth anniversary next year, as well as the 20th National Party Congress in 2022 which will include a major reshuffle under Xi’s leadership. Meanwhile, the party continues to capitalize on its domestic handling of the pandemic while pointing out Western “failures.” As for Europeans, the challenge will be to stand strong on their agenda, values and interests, in the face of a China that still considers Washington – no matter who is in the White House – the only leading interlocutor among Western powers. At least, there is now more European unity than ever in the past thirty years.
